WHAT DO WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT SKEPTICISM?
SOME TENSIONS IN STROUD’S TREATMENT OF SKEPTICISM

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To make philosophy the study of thought is to insist that philosophers’ thoughts should be about thoughts. It is not obvious why philosophers should accept that restriction.


INTRODUCTION
Since Antiquity the scope of skeptical doubt was already a controversial issue for ancient Pyrrhonians; however, textual evidence suggests that for them, skeptical doubts were directed exclusively towards disputes between philosophers, particularly in relation to the problem of determining the nature of good and bad things. But regarding everyday beliefs, Pyrrhonians assented to appearances as the rest of us (cf. Sextus Empiricus, PH. 1.7 and 1.23–4).¹ Sextus makes it explicit that a doxastic conception of human agency, where knowledge was a necessary condition for action, was commonplace among philosophers.²

Descartes (HR 219–220) also affirmed that skeptical doubt was possible only in philosophical inquiry but not in everyday life, where action results more relevant than truth. In the Treatise (1.4.57) Hume warned against a clash of intuitions regarding the skeptical

¹ As everybody knows, this is a very controversial exegetical point: on one hand Frede (1984) and Fogelin (1994) have defended an “urban” interpretation of Pyrrhonism; on the other hand, Barnes (1982) and Burnyeat (1980) have defended a “rustic” interpretation.
² For example Plato (Ap. 38a5-6, Prt. 345b5, Men. 98a, The. 145d11-e6), Aristotle (EN: 1169a17-18), and Stoics (Est. 2.85.13-86.4, DL 7.107).
problem of the external world: philosophical investigations on human knowledge ultimately led us to skepticism, whereas only “carelessness and in-attention” returned us to the common sense idea according to which we all accept the independent existence of the external world.

Currently, many philosophers have seen in this kind of stance the perfect occasion to restrict the skeptical bite to a mere game among philosophers, in which skepticism has little or nothing to do with everyday knowledge attributions. Thus, skepticism does not affect everyday life because its scope is quite another, which is situated far away from everyday life. This view has become orthodoxy.³

Undoubtedly, one of the main opponents of this restrictive boundedness of the skeptical bite has been Barry Stroud (1984: especially chapter 2, 2000b and 2000c). Stroud has tried to establish, contrary to the orthodox view, that skeptical doubts are intuitive and do not presuppose any philosophical position (ST, here after), which is why they extend legitimately to our everyday beliefs and hence the relevance of the skeptical challenge.⁴

Skeptical doubts –Stroud says– are the product of “a quest for an objective or detached understanding and explanation of the position we are in objectively.” (1984: 81), which is part of “a single conception of knowledge at work both in everyday life and in the philosophical investigation” (1984: 71 Italics are mine). This conception supports Stroud’s rejection of some dismissive antiskeptical strategies (such as Austin’s), but I think that Stroud’s main objective in preserving the intuitiveness of skepticism is to make sense of its philosophical significance, to show the importance of this problem for any epistemological project.

It is on this point where I want to focus in order to determine whether the ST is correct and, therefore, assess whether the conception of knowledge challenged by the skeptic is exactly the same one that we all share in everyday life. Thus my goal can be seen as updating the classic objection raised by Michael Williams (1997: chap 3, 2004: 135 and

³ See for example Williamson (2000: 15 and 2005: 681) and contextualist diagnosis of the skeptical challenge such as Cohen’s (2000: 100); but this is also a common stance into the German tradition, see Heidegger (1927: §43)
⁴ It is true that in more recent texts Stroud (2000a and 2003) has developed a transcendental antiskeptical strategy, but I do not think that anything of what he there says can be taken as a change to his overall diagnosis of skepticism (1984), which is what I attempt to evaluate here. Wong (2011) also reads Stroud’s latest antiskeptical strategy as opposed to contextualist dismissive antiskeptical strategies which consider that the entire skeptical problem can be reduced to a mere paradox.
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2011) against the intuitiveness of skeptical doubts, but in this occasion I would like to appeal to some empirical evidence and to some metaphilosophical resources.

In the following sections I present some problems for ST. I will start by questioning the evidence in its support and afterwards, I will try to show that Stroud’s position is unstable: sometimes he seems closer to orthodoxy and this proximity produces some tensions in his treatment of the skeptical problem; in particular, he insists on the intuitiveness of the skeptical challenge but, at the same time, he recognizes some practical constraint that hides it from the everyday perspective. I conclude with a metaphilosophical distinction designed to relieve those very same tensions in order to propose a simpler understanding of the skeptical problematic.

1. AGAINST STROUD’S EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF ST

From my perspective, Stroud’s evidence in supports of ST is twofold: (1) the supposed intuitiveness of the skeptical position and (2) the generality of the epistemological project that leads to skepticism. In this section I will try to offer some facts that undermine both types of evidence.

1.1 INTUITIVENESS OF SKEPTICAL DOUBTS:

Stroud’s main evidence to sustain the skeptical symmetry between the domain of the philosophical investigation and everyday life comes from the intuitiveness and persuasiveness that he attributes to the skeptical challenge, which in turns “appeals to something deep in our nature and seems to raise a real problem about the human condition.” (1984: 39). If so, it seems that Stroud’s diagnosis is correct: skeptical doubts in everyday life are of the same kind as those in philosophical inquiry; difference comes only in a gradual fashion.

The problem is, however, that Stroud (1984: 65) himself states that the demands of everyday life are quite different from those of philosophical inquiry: the first one is concerned mainly with action while the latter is concerned with truth (in harmony with the Cartesian diagnosis mentioned before). Since action is constrained by some spatiotemporal factors, eliminating all potential defeaters is something that obstructs the action itself, which is why skeptical doubts do not impact everyday life after all. Now we have an account of why skepticism does not have an impact on everyday life: what matters there is action, not truth.

This is the first tension that I find in Stroud’s diagnosis of the skeptical challenge:
skeptical doubts are of the same kind as everyday life doubts, however, the former are “pure” in a sense that the latter cannot be, given all the practical constraints. That means that the difference is one of degree? I do not think so. The problem here is, from my perspective, that there are some occasions in which exactly the same kind of process gives rise to very different phenomena: cell growth, for example, is responsible for normal cell reproduction, but also for cancer, a very different phenomenon. I suspect that the same applies to the skeptical problem: everyday life doubts and skeptical ones are different phenomena even if they derive from the very same source, namely, our epistemic practices.

Stroud (1984: chapter 2) tries to defuse a similar objection, which comes from Austin’s (1962) ordinary language philosophy and according to which, the skeptic is changing the meaning of “knowledge” by placing new and higher demands for that word than it seems to have in everyday life. Against this, Stroud points out that the skeptic has made no change at all in the meaning of “to know”, because in both domains (philosophical investigation and everyday life) what we pursue “is to know, whether and how the conditions necessary and sufficient for our knowing things about the world are fulfilled” (1984: 69). In order to reinforce his conclusion, Stroud appeals to “the ease with which we all acknowledge, when presented with the case, that Descartes ought to know that he is not dreaming if he is to know that he is sitting by the fire with a piece of paper in his hand. The force we feel in the skeptical argument when we first encounter it is itself evidence that the conception of knowledge employed in the argument is the very conception we have been operating with all along.” (1984: 71 Italics are mine).

I read this defense of the unequivocal nature of “knowing” as an appeal to the universal and stable character of the skeptical intuition, an intuition that all of us are prone to feeling – following Stroud – when faced with skeptical scenarios. This defense certainly looks appealing against Austin’s antiskeptical strategy which is simply based on the ordinary usages of “to know”. The problem here is, from my perspective, that the question regarding the intuitiveness of the skeptical arguments is a cognitive question that cannot be tackled from an aprioristic perspective as Stroud does, but it requires empirical evidence in order to be settled.

I would like to recover this objection from another place, redirecting the attack now at the underlying putative skeptical intuition stressed by Stroud: on one hand, Pritchard (2014: 215-6) has recently showed that skeptical premises such as (SK1): “I am unable to
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know that I am not a BIV” and (SK2) “But I need to be able to know that I am not a BIV if I am to know that I have hands”, are not intuitive among non-philosophers, and even worst, (SK2) is actually seems to be intuitively false for most of them.

On the other hand, experimental philosophers have recently provided empirical evidence in order to show that most of our epistemic intuitions, on which skeptical premises are based, vary as a function of some factors such as ethnicity, gender, education level, etc. In the case of the skeptical intuition behind the Brain in a Vat argument, they found that it seems to vary as a function of the degree of philosophical education: as the degree of philosophical formation increases, so does the sensitivity to skeptical intuitions:

We found a quite significant difference between low and high philosophy groups on this probe (Fischer Exact Test, p = .016) The evidence indicates that students with less philosophy are more likely to claim that the person knows he's not a brain in a vat. This suggests that the propensity for skeptical intuitions varies significantly as a function of exposure to philosophy. (Nichols, Stich and Weinberg, 2003:242).

If the force of skeptical intuition is evidence in favor of ST, but in the end there is no such thing, as this empirical evidence shows, it seems to me that ST would be weakened considerably.

Appealing to this kind of empirical evidence does not mean that I am subscribing the so-called “positive program” of experimental philosophy (Weinberg, 2011: 823) –taking the information revealed in the experiments as evidence for or against substantive philosophical thesis–, but I’m very sympathetic with the “negative program”, that is, appealing to that same experimental evidence only to undermine the methodological practice of appealing to intuitions in the first place;5 precisely the kind of methodology favored by Stroud’s approach to the skeptical challenge.

1.2 THE GENERALITY OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROJECT:

5 Facing this kind of maneuver, Pritchard (2014: 225-7) has tried a defense of the intuitiveness of the skeptical challenge appealing to expert’s intuitions (intuitions produced by philosophical theorizing). So, what matters are the intuitions of experts and not the intuitions of laymen. For a very persuasive attack on philosophical expertise see Machery (2011) and for a defense see Williamson (2007 and 2011).
In several places Stroud has argued that what characterizes epistemological research (research that seeks to establish what human knowledge is and how it is obtained) is its general character, epistemologists are looking for a complete account of human knowledge:

What we seek in the philosophical theory of knowledge is an account that is completely general in several respects. We want to understand how any knowledge at all is possible—how anything we currently accept amounts to knowledge. Or, less ambitiously, we want to understand with complete generality how we come to know anything at all in a certain specific domain. (2000b: 101).

The problem is that it is precisely the search of such generality that undermines the project itself: it is not possible to give a non-circular and complete explanation of some domain of knowledge, which does not end in skepticism about the project itself. This is another way in which Stroud has presented the traditional skeptical challenge about knowledge of the external world: it is impossible to justify the existence of the external world by appealing only to perception because it is not possible to appeal to some kind of independent justification (independent from perception itself). Stroud presents this thesis as an inevitable result, as a necessary fate of everyone who is embarking on the epistemological project. Furthermore, that is also the reason why Stroud has rejected externalist approaches to the skeptical problematic: they are unable to provide us a general and complete understanding of our cognitive enterprise.

However, I think that Stoud’s non-circular requirement regarding our understanding of human knowledge can be challenged from at least two different angles: First, from an epistemological level: there are several epistemological theories which imply a non-circular understanding of knowledge. The epistemology of entitlements, for example, holds that there are some basic beliefs (“cornerstone beliefs” in Crispin Wright’s (2004) version) which are justified independently of perception; although such epistemic support is non-evidential. Bolder yet is Pryor’s dogmatism (2000 and 2004) which completely rejects the need for independent evidence in favor of, say, the justificatory force that we ordinarily assign to perception. Both projects could be seen as challenging the generality of the

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6 I see this kind of metaskepticism regarding the very epistemological project closer to Fogelin's skepticism regarding philosophy itself, a kind of skepticism that is also found in Hume and Wittgenstein.
epistemological project that Stroud uses to sustain ST: not even in the domain of philosophical inquiry does this kind of generality seem to be necessary.

Second, from a metaphilosophical level: it is possible to say that when Stroud is talking about the generality of the epistemological project, he is conflating two very different epistemic statuses, namely knowledge and understanding. Knowledge can be compatible with an externalist modeling, as Stroud (2009) has conceded, but understanding is, by design, an internalist category because in order to get understanding the agent has to be always in a position to reflect on the coherence among all propositions that constitute his system of knowledge. That is why Stroud’s unsatisfactory charge against externalist approaches strikes most externalists as begging the question against externalism. (I return to a similar point at the end of this paper).

From my perspective, these two upshots also weaken Stroud’s Thesis regarding the intuitiveness of the skeptical challenge.

2. PYRRHONIAN SKEPTICISM VS CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE?

Criticizing Fogelin’s Pyrrhonism, according to which mere reflection on the conditions under which we make ordinary knowledge claims is enough to raise our levels of scrutiny, generating skepticism, Stroud seems (paradoxically) to align with the orthodox interpretation of skepticism, which restricts the scope of skeptical doubt to the field of philosophical investigation:

The systematic failure of all such attempts to transcend the available data is what the Pyrrhonian reflections reveal. On that point, as I said, I think the Pyrrhonist is completely right, and for the reasons he gives. With knowledge-claims as understood in everyday life things are not the same [...] Nothing the Pyrrhonist invokes to show that knowledge as the traditional epistemologist tries to explain it is impossible can be shown to stand in the way of that everyday knowledge. [...] But nothing could settle the traditional philosopher’s question of which of several competing possibilities holds in the world around us, if it can be settled only by perception, and whatever anyone could perceive always falls short of any states of affairs of the world. That is one difference between knowledge in everyday life and what

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Here it seems that for Stroud, unlike Fogelin, skeptical doubts in everyday life can be overcome, at least in principle; while in the field of philosophical investigation they cannot. This appears to be a second tension regarding ST, one that could be apparently and easily relieved by appealing to the traditional distinction between Pyrrhonian and Cartesian skepticism: Stroud (1984: vii-viii) embraces the traditional distinction between Pyrrhonian skepticism (with its corresponding practical aim) and Cartesian skepticism (which constitutes an exclusively theoretical problem). However, Stroud’s treatment of Cartesian skepticism has a strong resemblance to the Pyrrhonian treatment of the apraxia objection, as we already saw: in order to avoid the devastating conclusion of Cartesian skepticism Stroud must maintain a domain of beliefs out of skeptical reach.

If Pyrrhonism is not just an epistemological stance, but a way of life, the traditional apraxia objection asks: what if it could not possibly be lived? The Pyrrhonian response (PH: 1.23-24) is to adopt a fourfold commitment restricting the scope of skeptical doubt in order to ensure rational agency. We have previously shown that this maneuver has been adopted by both Humean and Cartesian skeptics, and even by Stroud’s diagnosis of skepticism. The problem is that this maneuver not only undermines ST, but can also be used to erase the traditional distinction between Pyrrhonian and Cartesian skepticism in the sense that the latter also has a practical concern in its agenda, namely to ensure rational agency: being a skeptic only makes sense in the context of philosophical inquiry, but not in everyday life.8

3. METAPHILOSOPHY

Recently, several philosophers (Williamson, 2007: chap 2, for instance) have pointed out that in the dominant naturalistic perspective in philosophy, practitioners have substituted the traditional study of concepts – conceptual analysis – for the study of phenomena themselves: in contemporary metaphysics, for example they study fundamental entities themselves and not the way we represent them through concepts. Something similar happens in the philosophy of perception, where philosophers seem more interested in the nature of conceptual content and not just in our own concepts of them. However, it is still true that we often need to build theories (create representations) to indirectly approach

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8 Here I’m not trying to erase all the differences between Pyrrhonian and Cartesian skepticism, my goal is only to argue against the commonplace according to which Cartesian skepticism lacks of practical concerns at all.
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phenomena themselves, which is a widespread methodology in science: historians make use of documents (texts, maps, etc.) in order to find out what happened, and scientists build machines which, in turn, create representations that help us discover something about the facts themselves (2007: 42). Although this methodological dependence is quite common, it should not lead us to confuse the concepts and representations that we use to investigate phenomena with the phenomena themselves.

I find a similar methodological recommendation in Stroud’s rejection (1984: 72-74) of Austin’s (1967) antiskeptical strategy: the skeptic does not change the meaning of “know” –Stroud says– or alter the notion of “knowledge” that we use in everyday life, and that’s the reason why discussions on the linguistic usage of “know” do not touch the skeptical challenge (1984: 56). It seems natural to expect that, once armchair methodology is rejected, the naturalistic approach will adopted, but this does not seem to be the case with Stroud’s position: I’m perplexed by the fact that Stroud (2000b: 99) also appears to deny a naturalistic (externalist) approach to the problem of knowledge; for Stroud it is wrong to treat this phenomenon as any other natural phenomenon such as “digestion or photosynthesis”.

Apparently, for Stroud the problem of knowledge can only be investigated with an armchair methodology which, from my perspective, puts us back on the side of Austin’s project which Stroud was trying to refute: action against the skeptic is exclusively within the theoretical domain. This is the third tension that I find in Stroud’s treatment of skepticism: as epistemologists, are we concerned with the phenomenon of knowledge itself or with our theories about it? What is Stroud’s position regarding naturalistic approaches to the phenomenon of knowledge?

4. SKEPTICAL SOLUTIONS TO SKEPTICISM?

The above methodological recommendations encourage us to maintain the distinction between phenomena and our representations of them, but regarding the skeptical problem our position may be the same as that of historians or scientists: our theories of knowledge are our best devices to achieve a good understanding of the problem of knowledge itself. But perhaps this distinction is also helpful to explain why the problem of skepticism does not impact everyday life, despite the intuitiveness of skepticism and the correctness of its arguments: the skeptical bite only has a place in philosophical inquiry,
where it undermines our best conceptions (understanding) of “knowledge”, but it does not make us abandon our actual knowledge claims in everyday life.

Stalnaker (2008: 5) describes skeptical solutions as “a shift from an internal to an external perspective”, where the change of perspective obeys the acknowledgement that a specific problem posed from the internal perspective is insoluble. It is then that the skeptical solution provides an explanation of the conceptual resources we use to generate knowledge, for example. However, this does not mean that this explanation has to be purely descriptive: having theories of our conceptual resources involved in epistemic achievements allows us to assess the epistemic performance of agents. For the particular case of skepticism, skeptical solutions would be something like this: since it is impossible to establish in a conclusive way when a subject knows something about the external world by appealing exclusively to her own experience (internal perspective), we can transform this question into another one: why are our epistemic practices involving the external world successful? Perhaps these questions are more sympathetic with naturalistic approaches towards knowledge (mainly externalist approaches), but the appeal to externalism need not be seen as a circular strategy which begs the question against the skeptic, but rather as “the acknowledgement that the skeptical solution is not a solution to the skeptical problem on the internalist’s terms.” (2008: 6). Put it into a nutshell: the skeptical challenge is only a theoretical problem regarding our understanding of human knowledge, and that is why externalist approaches to it have been unsatisfactory. But at level of first order knowledge, that is, regarding the phenomenon of knowledge itself, externalism seems to be our best approach to it.

Then the acknowledgement that the skeptical problem raised in its own terms is insoluble, could be seen as the acknowledgement that it is a problem that only arises in philosophical inquiry regarding our different ways of representing the phenomenon of knowledge, which is the reason it does not impact our epistemic practices in everyday life.

Applied to the skeptical problem, the metaphilosophical distinction between phenomena and our representations of them could also relieve the other tensions that I noted earlier in Stroud’s treatment of skepticism:

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9 I see the same maneuver in Kant’s and Stroud’s transcendental antiskeptical strategies: once it is settled that skepticism is insoluble in its own terms, they attempt a transcendental solution from an external perspective in which we do not ask any more for the objects themselves, but for the conditions that make knowledge possible.
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a) THE SCOPE OF SKEPTICISM: skepticism is exclusively a theoretical problem that has to do with the strength of our theories of knowledge (our understanding of the phenomenon of knowledge), so it has no impact on everyday life, that is, it does not touch our everyday knowledge attributions. Since there does not seem to be a universal skeptical intuition, skeptical doubts are unnatural doubts.

b) PYRRHONIAN SKEPTICISM VS CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM: Appealing to the practical orientation of Pyrrhonism in order to distinguish it from Cartesian skepticism is an artificial maneuver, both types of skepticism have always been theoretical stances: Pyrrhonism had a practical dimension because it aimed to reach ataraxia on philosophical issues and not because it allowed skeptical doubts to seep into our everyday beliefs. It is true that Pyrrhonism was also a way of life which promoted a “good life” or “eudaimonia”, but this is also a term of art, a philosophical representation of some practical ideals. Independent of a theory of knowledge or of a theory of ethics, nothing could count as evidence for or against a skeptical or eudaimonistic stance.

c) INTERNALIST VS. EXTERNALIST APPROACHES TO SKEPTICISM: Recognizing the theoretical dimension of the skeptical problem also opens the door to dissolving the apparent tension between internalist and externalist treatments of skepticism: the first one is focused primarily on the coherence of our representations of knowledge (understanding), while the latter is directed towards the phenomenon of knowledge itself, and this distinction could also explain the fruitless character of externalist approaches to skepticism.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have thus seen that there is a metaphilosophical distinction regarding the scope of the skeptical challenge: on one hand, we have traditional approaches interested mainly in our concept (or understanding) of knowledge and that is where the skeptical challenge is relevant. On the other hand, we have questions about our everyday epistemic practices in which there are several formidable challenges, but the skeptical one does not figure among them. Without this kind of distinction, I think, even the most sophisticated epistemological theories (such as virtue epistemology, knowledge first epistemology, in sum, every externalist theory) will be unable to deal with the skeptical challenge in a satisfactory way.
There is thus a good reason for supposing that this kind of metaphilosophical distinction is epistemologically useful.

REFERENCES:
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